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Abstract—The increasing adoption of Cloud storage poses a 
number of privacy issues. Users wish to preserve full control 
over their sensitive data and cannot accept that it is accessible 
by the remote storage provider. Previous research was made 
on techniques to protect data stored on untrusted servers; 
however we argue that the cloud architecture presents a 
number of open issues.  To handle them, we present an 
approach where confidential data is stored in a highly 
distributed database, partly located on the cloud and partly on 
the clients. Data is shared in a secure manner using a simple 
grant-and-revoke permission of shared data and we have 
developed a system test implementation, using an in-memory 
Relational Data Base Management System with row-level data 
encryption for fine-grained data access control. 
Keywords-cloud; database; encryption; data sharing; 
privacy; distributed data. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing is the commercial evolution of grid 
computing [23]; it provides users with readily available, pay-
as-you-go computing and storage power, allowing them to 
dynamically adapt their IT (Information Technology) costs 
to their needs. In this fashion, users need neither costly 
competence in IT system management nor huge investments 
in the start-up phase in preparation for future growth.  
While the cloud computing concept is drawing much 
interest, several obstacles remain to its widespread adoption, 
including:  
• Current limits of ICT infrastructure: availability, 
reliability and quality of service; 
• Different paradigm of development of cloud 
applications with respect to those used for desktop  
applications; 
• Privacy risks for confidential information residing in 
the cloud.  
Hopefully, the first obstacle will diminish over time, 
thanks to increasing network availability; the second will 
progressively disappear by training new developers; the third 
issue however, is still far from being solved and may impair 
very seriously the real prospects of cloud computing. 
In this paper, we illustrate some techniques for providing 
data protection and confidentiality in outsourced databases 
(Section II), analyze some possible pitfalls of these 
techniques in Cloud Computing (Section III), and propose a 
new solution based on distributed systems (Section IV), 
experimentally implemented and benchmarked (Section V). 
I. THE PROBLEM OF PRIVACY 
The cloud infrastructure can be accessible to public users 
(Public Cloud) or only to those operating within an 
organization (Private Cloud) [3]. Generally speaking, 
external access to shared data held by the cloud goes through 
the usual authentication, authorization, and communication 
phases. The access control problem is well acknowledged in 
the database literature and available solutions guarantee a 
high degree of assurance.  
However, the requirement that the maintainer of the 
datastore cannot access or alter outsourced data is not easily 
met, especially on public clouds like Google App Engine for 
Business, Microsoft Azure Platform or Amazon EC2 
platform. 
Indeed, existing techniques for managing the outsourcing 
of data on untrusted database servers [13] [14] cannot be 
straightforwardly applied to public clouds, due to several 
reasons:  
• The physical structure of the cloud is, by definition, 
undetectable from the outside; who is really holding 
the data stored on the cloud?  
• The user often has no control over data replication; 
i.e., how many copies exist (including backups) and 
how are they managed?  
• The lack of information on the geographical location 
of data (or its variation over time) may lead to 
jurisdiction conflicts when different national laws 
apply. 
In the next section, we will briefly summarize available 
techniques for data protection on untrusted servers, and show 
how their relation to the problems outlined above. 
A. Data Protection  
To ensure data protection in outsourcing, the literature 
reports three major techniques [6]:  
• Data encryption [15]; 
• Data fragmentation and encryption [16], which in 
turn can be classified into two major techniques: 
o non-communicating servers [17][18]; 
o unlinkable fragments [19]; 
• Data fragmentation with owner involvement [20]. 
1) Data encryption  
To prevent unauthorized access by the Datastore 
Manager (DM) of the outsourced Relational Data Base 
Management Systems (RDBMS), data is stored in encrypted 
form. Obviously, the DM does not know the encryption 
keys, which are stored apart from the data. The RDBMS 
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receives an encrypted database and works on bit-streams that 
only the clients, who hold the decryption keys, can interpret 
correctly.  
Figure 1 shows the transformation of a plain text tuple 
into an encrypted one. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Data encryption, source: [6] 
 
Decryption keys are generated and distributed to trusted 
clients by the data owner or by a trusted delegate. 
Encryption can be performed at different levels of 
granularity: field, record, table, db [28]. Usually, the level 
adopted is the record (i.e., a tuple in relational databases).  
It is important to remark that since data is encrypted, the 
DBMS cannot index it based on plaintext and therefore it 
cannot resolve all queries. Available proposals solve this 
problem by providing, for each encrypted field to be 
indexed, an additional indexable field, obtained by applying 
a non-injective transformation f to plaintext values (e.g., a 
hash of the field's content). Using this method, equality 
queries can be performed easily, although with a precision 
index < 1 (to prevent statistical data mining). The trusted 
client, after receiving the encrypted result set for the query, 
will decrypt it and exclude spurious tuples. However range 
queries are difficult to compute, since the transformation f in 
general will not (and should not) preserve the order relations 
of the original plaintext data.  Specifically, it will be 
impossible for the outsourced RDBMS to answer range 
queries that cannot be reduced to multiple equality 
conditions (e.g., 1<=x<=3 can be translated into x=1 or x=2 
or x=3) unless specific techniques are applied. In literature, 
there are several proposals for f, including:  
1. Domain partitioning [24]: the domain is partitioned 
into equivalence classes, each corresponding to a single 
value in the codomain of f; 
2. Secure hashing [13]: secure one-way hash function, 
which takes as input the clear values of an attribute and 
returns the corresponding index values. f must be 
deterministic and non-injective.  
To handle range queries, a solution, among others, is to 
use an encrypted version of a B ± tree to store plaintext 
values, and maintain the values order. Because the values 
have to be encrypted, the tree is managed at the Client side 
and it is read-only in the Server side. Alternatively, the 
position information of each field in the original relation can 
be added to the encrypted data [33]. 
Let us, now, consider data protection strategies based on 
partitioning. 
1) Data fragmentation  
Normally, of all the outsourced data, only some columns 
and/or some relations are confidential, so it is possible to 
split the outsourced information in two parts, one for 
confidential and one for public data. Its aim is to minimize 
the computational load of encryption/decryption.  
a) Non-communicating servers  
In this technique, two split databases are stored, each in a 
different untrusted server (called, say, S1 and S2). The two 
untrusted servers need to be independent and non-
communicating to prevent their alliance and reconstruction 
of the complete information. In this situation, the information 
may be stored as plaintext at each server.  
Each Client query is decomposed in two subqueries: one 
for S1 and one for S2. The result sets have to be related and 
filtered, by the Client. 
Figure 2 schematizes the resulting structure. 
 
DB1 DB2
Server Server
Desktop
 
Figure 2.  Non-communicating servers 
 
b) Unlinkable fragments  
In reality, it is not easy to ensure that split servers do not 
communicate; therefore the previous technique may be 
inapplicable. A possible remedy is to divide information in 
two or more fragments. Each fragment contains all the fields 
of the original information, but some are in clear form while 
the others are encrypted. To protect encrypted values from 
frequency attacks, a suitable salt is applied to each 
encryption. Fragments are guaranteed to be unlinkable (i.e., 
it is impossible to reconstruct the original relation and to 
determine the sensitive values and associations without the 
decrypting key). These fragments may be stored in one or 
more servers.  
Each query is then decomposed in two subqueries:  
• The first, executed on the Server, chooses a fragment 
(all fragments contain the entire information) and 
selects tuples from it according to clear text values. 
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It returns a result set where some fields are 
encrypted;  
• The second, executed on the Client (only if 
encrypted fields are involved in the query), decrypts 
the information and removes the spurious tuples.  
Figure 3 schematizes the resulting structure. 
DB1 DB2
Server
Desktop
 
Figure 3.  Unlinkable fragments 
 
2) Data fragmentation with owner involvement  
Another adaptation of the non-communicating servers 
technique consists of storing locally the sensitive data and 
relations, while outsourcing storage of the generic data. So, 
each tuple is split in a server part and in a local part, with the 
primary key in common. The query is then resolved as 
shown above.  
Figure 4 schematizes the resulting structure. 
 
DB1
DB2
Server
Desktop
 
Figure 4.  Data fragmentation with owner involvement 
 
B. Selective access  
In many scenarios, access to data is selective, with 
different users enjoying different views over the data. Access 
control can discriminate between read and write operations 
on an entire record or only on a part of it.  
An intuitive way to handle this issue is to encrypt 
different portions of data with different keys that are then 
distributed to users according to their access privileges. To 
minimize overhead it is required that:  
• No more than one key is released to each user; 
• Each resource is encrypted not more than once.  
To achieve these objectives, a hierarchical organization 
of keys can be envisioned. Basically, users with the same 
access privileges are grouped and each resource is encrypted 
with a key corresponding to the set of users that can access 
it. This way, a single key can be possibly used to encrypt 
more than one resource.  
1) Dynamic rights management  
Should the user’s rights change over time (e.g., the user 
changes department) it is necessary to remove that user from 
a group/role as follows:  
• Encrypt data by a new key; 
• Remove the original encrypted data; 
• Send the new key to the rest of the group.  
Note that these operations must be performed by data 
owner because the untrusted DBMS has no access to the 
keys. This active role of the data owner goes somewhat 
against the reasons for choosing to outsource data in the first 
place. 
a) Temporal key management  
An important issue, common to many access control 
policies, concerns time-dependent constraints of access 
permissions. In many real situations, it is likely that a user 
may be assigned a certain role or class for only a limited 
time. In such case, users need a different key for each time 
period. A time-bound hierarchical key assignment scheme is 
a method to assign time-dependent encryption keys and 
private information to each class in the hierarchy in such a 
way that key derivation depends also on temporal 
constraints. Once a time period expires, users in that class 
should not be able to access any subsequent keys unless 
further authorized to do so [9].  
b) Database replica  
In [7], the authors, exploiting the never ending trend to a 
lower price-per-byte in storage, propose to replicate n times 
the source database, where n is the number of different roles 
having access to the database. Each database replica is a 
view, entirely encrypted using the key created for the 
corresponding role. Each time a role is created, the 
corresponding view is generated and encrypted with a new 
key expressly generated for the newly created role. Users do 
not own the real keys, but receive a token that allows them to 
address a request-to-cipher to a set KS of key servers on the 
cloud.  
C. A document base sample: Crypstore  
Crypstore is a non-transactional architecture for the 
distribution of confidential data, whose structure is shown in 
Figure 5. Crypstore’s Storage Server contains data in 
encrypted form, so it cannot read them. User who wants to 
access data is authenticated at the Key Servers with the 
certificate issued by the Data Administrator and requires the 
decryption key. The Key Servers are N and, to ensure that 
none of them knows the whole decryption key, each of them 
contains only a part of the encryption key. To rebuild the 
key, only M (<N) parts of key are needed; redundancy 
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provides greater robustness to failures and attacks (e.g., 
Denial of Service attacks).  
 
   
Figure 5.  Crypstore  
 
Really, Crypstore is an application of the time-honored 
"divide and conquer" technique, where data is separated 
from decryption keys.  
Here privacy is not entirely guaranteed because, 
theoretically at least, the owner of Key Servers and the 
Storage Server may collude. The only way to exclude this 
(however remote) possibility is to have trusted Key Servers, 
but this would be equivalent to store the data directly, as 
plaintext, in a trusted storage. In practice, however, the 
probability of collusion decreases with the number of players 
involved and can be safely ignored in many cases.  
II. PRIVACY WITHIN THE CLOUD  
All techniques discussed above are based on data 
encryption and/or data fragmentation using full separation of 
roles and of execution environments between the user and 
the datastore (and possibly the keystore) used to manage the 
outsourced data.  
Let us now compare the assumptions behind such 
techniques with two of the basic tenets of current cloud 
computing architectures: data and applications being on the 
“same side of the wall”, and data being managed via 
semantic datastores rather than by a conventional RDBMS.  
A. On the same side of the wall  
Ubiquitous access is a major feature of cloud computing 
architectures. It guarantees that cloud application users will 
be unrestrained by their physical location (with internet 
access) and unrestrained by the physical device they use to 
access the cloud. 
To satisfy the above requirements (in particular the 
second), we normally use thin clients, which run cloud 
applications remotely via a web user interface.  
The three main suppliers of Public Cloud Infrastructure 
(Google App Engine for Business, Amazon Elastic Compute 
Cloud and Windows Azure Platform) all include a datastore, 
and an environment for remote execution summarized in 
Tables I and II:  
TABLE I.  DATASTORE SOLUTIONS USED BY PUBLIC CLOUDS 
Environment Datastore 
Google  Bigtable  
Amazon  IBM DB2  
IBM Informix Dynamic Server  
Microsoft SQLServer Standard 2005  
MySQL Enterprise  
Oracle Database 11g  
Others installed by users 
Microsoft  Microsoft SQL Azure  
TABLE II.  EXECUTION ENVIRONMENTS USED BY PUBLIC CLOUDS 
Environment Execution environment 
Google  J2EE (Tomcat + GWT)  
Python  
Amazon  J2EE (IBM WAS, Oracle WebLogic Server) 
and others installed by users 
Microsoft  .Net  
 
In all practical scenarios, public cloud suppliers handle 
both data and application management.  
If the cloud supplier is untrustworthy, it can intercept 
communications, modify executable software components 
(e.g., using aspect programming), monitor the user 
application memory, etc. 
Hence, available techniques for safely outsourcing data 
to untrusted DBMS no longer guarantee the confidentiality 
of data outsourced to the cloud.  
The essential point consists in having the data and the 
user interface application logic on the same side of the wall 
(see Figure 6). 
This is a major difference w.r.t. outsourced database 
scenarios, where presentation was handled by trusted clients. 
In the end, the data must be presented to the user in an 
intelligible and clear form; that is the moment when a 
malicious agent operating in the cloud has more 
opportunities to intercept the data. To prevent unwanted 
access to the data at presentation time, it would be 
appropriate moving the presentation logics off the cloud to a 
trusted environment that may be an intranet or, at the bottom 
level, a personal computer. 
However, separating data (which would stay in the cloud) 
from the presentation logics may enable the creation of local 
copies of data, and lead to an inefficient cooperation between 
the two parts.   
 
 
Figure 6.  The wall 
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B. Semantic datastore  
Cloud computing solutions largely rely on semantic (non-
relational) DBMS. These systems do not store data in tabular 
format, but following the natural structure of objects. After 
more than twenty years of experimentation (see, for instance, 
[10] for the Galileo system developed at the University of 
Pisa), today, the lower performance of these systems is no 
longer a problem. In the field of cloud computing, there is a 
particular attention to Google Bigtable.  
"Bigtable is a distributed storage system for managing 
structured data that is designed to scale to a very large size: 
petabytes of data across thousands of commodity servers. In 
many ways, Bigtable resembles a database: it shares many 
implementation strategies with databases." [11] 
With a semantic datastore like Bigtable, there is a more 
strict integration between in-memory data and stored-data; 
they are almost indistinguishable from the programmer 
viewpoint. There are not distinct phases when the program 
loads data from disk into main memory or, in the opposite 
direction, when program serialize data on disk. Applications 
do not even know where the data is stored, as it is scattered 
over the cloud.  
In such a situation, the data outsourcing techniques 
discussed before cannot be applied directly, because they 
were designed for untrusted RDBMS. 
III. OUR APPROACH  
We are now ready to discuss our new approach to the 
issue of cloud data privacy. We build over the notion 
introduced in [7] of defining a view for every user 
group/role, but we prevent performance degradation by 
keeping all data views in the user environment.  
 Specifically, we atomize the application/database pair, 
providing a copy per user. Every instance runs locally, and 
maintains only authorized data that is replicated and 
synchronized among all authorized users.  
In the following subsections we will analyze our solution 
in detail.  
A. Information sharing by distributed system  
We will consider a system composed of:  
1. Local agents distributed at client side; 
2. A central synchronization point.  
Figure 7 shows the proposed architecture: 
 
 untrusted Synchronizer 
never holds 
plaintext data
Local 
agent 
with local db
 
Figure 7.  The architecture 
 
1) The model  
Henceforth, we will use the term dossier to indicate a set 
of related information. Our data model may be informally 
represented by the diagram in Figure 8. 
 
   
Figure 8.  The model  
 
In our model, each node represents a local, single-user 
application/database dedicated to an individual user (un). The 
node stores only the dossiers that un owns. Shared dossiers 
(in this example, d1) are replicated on each node. When a 
node modifies a shared dossier, it must synchronize, also 
using heuristics and learning algorithms, with the other 
nodes that hold a copy of it.  Below we give a simple SWOT 
analysis of this idea. 
2) Strength/Opportunities  
• Information sharing using untrusted Synchronizer; 
• Small amount of local data, less attractive for 
attackers; 
• Only the final user has clear-text information; 
• Unrestrained individual nodes, that can also work 
offline (with deferred synchronization);  
• Simplicity of data management (single user);  
• Completeness of local information.  
To clarify the last point, suppose that the user un wants to 
know the number of the dossier she is treating. In a classic 
intranet solution, where dossiers reside on their owners' 
servers, in addition to its database, un should examine the 
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data stores of all other collaborating users. With our solution, 
instead, un will simply perform a local query because the 
dossiers are replicated at each client. 
3) Weaknesses/Threats  
• Complexity of deferred synchronization schemes 
[21];  
• Necessity to implement a mechanism for 
grant/revoke and access control permissions. 
This last point is particularly important and it deserves 
further discussion: 
• Each user (except the data owner) may have partial 
access to a dossier. Therefore each node contains 
only the allowed portion of the information; 
• Authorization, i.e., granting to a user uj access to a 
dossier dk, can be achieved by the data owner simply 
by transmitting to each node only the data it is 
allowed to access; 
• The inverse operation can be made in the case of a 
(partial or complete) revocation of access rights. An 
obvious difficulty lies in ensuring that data becomes 
no longer available to the revoked node. This is 
indeed a moot point, as it is impossible – whatever 
the approach - to prevent trusted users from creating 
local copies of data while they are authorized and 
continue using them after revocation. We are 
evaluating the opportunity to use watermarking for 
relational databases [26] to provide copyright 
protection and tamper detection. 
B. Proposed solution  
We are now ready to analyze our solution in detail. To 
simplify the discussion, we introduce the following 
assumptions:  
• Each dossier has only one owner; 
• Only the dossier's owner can change it. 
These assumptions permit the use of an elementary 
cascade synchronization in which the owner will submit the 
changes to the receivers. However, they can be relaxed at the 
cost of a higher complexity in synchronization [34]. 
 
   
Figure 9.  Deployment diagram of distributed system  
 
Our solution consists of two parts: a trusted client and a 
remote untrusted synchronizer (see Figure 9). 
The client maintains local data storage where:  
• The dossiers that she owns are (or at least can be) 
stored as plain-text; 
• The others, instead, are encrypted each with a 
different key.  
The Synchronizer stores the keys to decrypt the shared 
dossiers owned by the local client and the modified dossiers 
to synchronize.  
When another client needs to decrypt a dossier, she 
connects to the Synchronizer and obtains the corresponding 
decryption key.  
The data and the keys are stored in two separate entities, 
none of which can access information without the 
collaboration of the other part.  
1) Structure  
From the architectural point of view, we divide our 
components into two packages, a local (client agent), which 
contains the dossier plus additional information such as 
access lists, and a remote (global synchronizer), which 
contains the list of dossiers to synchronize, their decryption 
keys and the public keys of clients.  
A UML view of involved classes is shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Class view 
 
2) Grant  
An owner willing to grant rights on a dossier must follow 
the sequence shown in Figure 11:  
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Figure 11.  Grant sequence 
Namely, for each receiver, the owner:  
• Generates the decryption key  
• Encrypts it with the public key of the receiver to 
ensure that others cannot read it 
• Signs it with its private key to ensure its origin  
• Sends it to the Synchronizer, which verifies the 
origin and adds it to the storage of the decoding 
keys. The key is still encrypted with the public key 
of the receiver, so only the receiver can read it.  
3) Send  
When an owner modifies a dossier, she sends it to the 
Synchronizer the sequence shown in Figure 12:  
 
  
 
Figure 12.  Send sequence 
 
For each receiver, the owner:  
• Generates a "pending dossier" by removing 
information that the receiver should not have access 
to;  
• Encrypts the pending dossier with the previously 
generated decryption key; 
• Signs with his own private key to certificate its 
origin; 
• Sends it to the Synchronizer, which verifies the 
origin and adds it to the storage of "pending 
dossiers”. Again, the dossier is still encrypted with 
the public key of the receiver, so only the receiver 
can read it.  
4) Receive  
Periodically, each client updates un-owned dossiers by 
following the sequence shown in Figure 13:  
 
  
 
Figure 13.  Receive sequence 
 
Each client: 
• Requests the "pending dossiers" to the Synchronizer. 
• Stores the (still encrypted) dossier in  the local 
storage; 
• Removes the received dossiers from the 
Synchronizer. 
5) Use  
When a client needs to access an unowned (encrypted) 
dossier, the sequence shown in Figure 14 is used:  
 
  
 
Figure 14.  Use sequence 
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The client:  
• Asks the Synchronizer for the decryption key (that is 
encrypted by her public key); 
• Decrypts it with her private key;  
• Decrypts the dossier by the resulting decryption key. 
If the decryption key does not exist, two options are 
available:  
• The record is deleted from the local datastore 
because a revoke happened; 
• The record remains cached (encrypted) into the local 
datastore because access rights to it could be 
restored. 
6) Revoke  
To revoke access to a receiver, it is sufficient to delete 
the corresponding decryption key from the Synchronizer. 
The sequence diagram is shown in Figure 15.  
 
 
Figure 15.  Revoke sequence 
 
IV. EXPERIMENTATION 
To experiment with our architecture we implemented the 
custom client and Synchronizer. The client needs to use row-
level encryption. In a normal RDBMS, however, this 
technique has significant disadvantages in terms of 
performance and functionality: querying would be possible 
only through the construction of appropriate indexes for each 
column of the table (with a considerable waste of resources 
both in terms of time and space), while the constraints and 
foreign keys would be almost unusable.  
Another major issue concerns the management of keys: 
row-level encryption could potentially lead to the generation 
and maintenance (and / or distribution) of a key for each row 
of each table encrypted with this method. To solve (or 
reduce) the concern, we use some advanced techniques of 
key management, such as: 
• Broadcast (or Group) encryption [32]: rows are 
divided into equivalence classes, based on recipients. 
Every class is encrypted using an asymmetric 
algorithm where the encryption key is made in a way 
that each recipient can decrypt the information using 
only its own private key. Both the public and the 
private keys are generated by a trusted entity. 
• Identity Based Encryption [30]: it bounds the 
encryption key to the identity of the recipient. Each 
recipient generates by itself a key pair used to 
encrypt/decrypt information. 
• Attribute Based Encryption [31]: it bounds the 
encryption key to an attribute (a group) of recipient. 
Each recipient receives from a trusted entity the 
private key used to decrypt, while the sender 
calculates the encryption key. 
The complexity of these techniques is a major reason 
why conventional RDBMSs do not use encryption at the 
row-level. 
A. In memory databases 
An in-memory database (IMDB, also known as main 
memory database system or MMDB and as real-time 
database or RTDB) is a database management system that 
primarily relies on main memory for computer data storage 
[35]. It is important to remark that, while a conventional 
database system stores data on disk but caches it into 
memory for access, in an IMDB the data resides permanently 
in the main physical memory and there is a backup copy on 
disk [27].  
In-memory databases have recently become an intriguing 
topic for the database industry. With the mainstream 
availability of 64-bit servers with many gigabytes of memory 
a completely RAM based database solution is a tempting 
prospect to a much wider audience [36]. 
IMDBs are intended either for personal use (because they 
are comparatively small w.r.t. traditional databases), or for 
performance-critical systems (for their very low response 
time and very high throughput). They use main memory 
structures, so they need no translation from disk to memory 
form, and no caching and they perform better than traditional 
DBMSs with Solid State Disks.  
Normally, the use of volatile memory-based IMDBs 
supports the three ACID properties of atomicity, consistency 
and isolation, but lacks support for the durability property. 
To add this when non-volatile random access memory 
(NVRAM) is not available, IMDBs use a combination of 
transaction logging and primary database check-pointing to 
the system's hard disk: they log changes from committed 
transactions to physical medium and, periodically, update a 
disk image of the database. Having to write updates to disk, 
the write operations are heavier than read-only. Logging 
policies vary from product to product: some leave the choice 
of when to write the application on file, others do all the 
checkpoints at regular intervals of time or after a certain 
amount of data entered / edited. 
In Table III, we summarize pros and cons for IMDBs. 
TABLE III.  IMDBS PROS AND CONS 
Pros Cons 
Fast transactions 
No translation 
High reliability 
Multi-User Concurrency (few 
locks) 
Complexity of durability’s 
implementation  
Size limited by main memory  
 
Obviously, the limitation of this type of database is 
related to the amount of RAM on computer hosting the db. 
But given their nature, IMDBs are well suited to be 
distributed and replicated across multiple nodes to increase 
capacity and performance. 
The proposed solution works around this limitation: not 
having a single central database containing the whole data, 
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we preferred to give one database for each client application. 
This database contains only owned data, while external data 
will be added (or removed) via the synchronizer, based on 
access permissions. 
To minimize cryptography overhead, we encrypt only 
rows "received" by other nodes, while rows owned by the 
local node are stored in cleartext form. 
Well-known open solutions of IMDB are Apache Derby, 
HyperSQL (HSQLDB) and SQLite. For our implementation, 
we chose to use HyperSQL rel. 2.0. 
1) HyperSql 
HyperSQL [37] is a pure Java RDBMS. Its strength is, 
besides the lightness (about 1.3Mb for version 2.0), the 
capability to run either as a Server instance either as a 
module internal to an application (in-process). 
A database started "in-process" has the advantage of 
speed, but it is dedicated only to the containing application 
(no other application can query the database). For our 
purposes, we chose server mode. In this way, the database 
engine runs inside a JVM and will start one or more 
"in-process” databases, listening requests from processes in 
the local machine or remote computers.  
For interactions between clients and database server, we 
can use three different protocols: 
• HSQL Server: the fastest and most used. It 
implements a proprietary communication protocol; 
• HTTP Server: it is used when access to the server is 
limited only to HTTP. It consists of a web server that 
allows JDBC clients to connect over http; 
• HTTP Servlet: as the Http Server, but it is used when 
accessing the database is managed by a servlet 
container or by an application servlet (e.g., Tomcat). 
It is limited to using a single database. 
Several different types of databases (called catalogs) can 
be created with HyperSQL. The difference between them is 
the methodology adopted for data storage: 
• Res: this type of catalog provides for the storage of 
data into small JAR or ZIP files; 
• Mem: data is stored completely in the machine’s 
RAM, so there is no persistence of information 
outside of the application life cycle in the JVM; 
• File: data is stored in files residing into the file 
system of the machine.  
In our work, we used the latter type of databases. 
A catalog file can use up to six files on the file system for 
its operations. The name of these files consists of the name 
of the database plus a dot suffix. 
Assuming we have a database called "db_test", files will 
be: 
• db_test.properties containing the basic settings of the 
DB; 
• db_test.log: used to periodically save data from the 
database, to prevent data loss in case of a crash; 
• db_test.script: containing the table definitions and 
other components of the DB, plus data of not-cached 
tables; 
• db_test.data: containing the actual data of cached 
tables. It can be not present in some catalogs; 
• db_test.backup: containing the compressed backup 
of last “.data” file, that may be not present in some 
catalogs; 
• db_test.lobs: used for storing BLOB or CLOB fields. 
Besides these files, HyperSQL can connect to CSV files.  
A client application can connect to HyperSQL server 
using the JDBC driver (.Net and ODBC drivers are “in late 
stages of development”), specifying the type of database to 
access (file, mem or res). 
HyperSQL implements the SQL standard either for 
temporary tables either for persistent ones. Temporary tables 
(TEMP) are not stored on the file system and their life cycle 
is limited to the duration of the connection (i.e., of the 
Connection object). The visibility of data in a TEMP table is 
limited to the context of connection used to populate it. With 
regard to the persistent tables, instead, HyperSQL provides 
three different types of tables, according to the method used 
to store the data: 
• MEMORY: it is the default option when a table is 
created without specifying the type. Memory table 
data is kept entirely in memory, while any change to 
its structure or contents is recorded in .log and .script 
files. These two files are read at the opening of 
database to load data into memory. All changes are 
saved when closing the database. These processes 
can take a long time in the case of tables larger than 
10 MB. 
• CACHED: when this type of table is chosen, only 
part of the data (and related indexes) is stored in 
memory, thus allowing the use of large tables at the 
expense of performance. 
• TEXT: the data is stored in formatted files such as 
.csv. 
In our implementation, we use MEMORY tables. 
The Loader and the Serializer are the main parts of 
HyperSQL that we analyzed and modified. They are the 
mechanisms that load the data from text files at the opening 
and save them to the database at closing. 
B. Implemented solution 
1) Client side 
On the client side, using IMDBs, we have only two 
interactions between each local agent and the Synchronizer, 
as shown in Figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16.  State diagram of client 
 
We have modified the classes included in file hsqldb.jar 
to handle encryption. The basic idea was to manage 
encryption in the .log and .script text files. The rows that are 
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owned by the local client are stored in clear-text, while the 
shared rows “granted” by other owners are stored encrypted. 
The values contained in tables are stored in form of SQL 
insert: 
 
INSERT INTO table_name(field_1, field_2, …, field_n) 
VALUES(value_1, value_2, …, value_n) 
 
Earlier, to obtain control access granularity at the field 
level, we encrypted field by field. This way, the text 
contained in the database file is in the form of: 
 
INSERT INTO table_name(field_1, field_2, …, field_n) 
VALUES(pk, encrypted_value_2, …, encrypted_value_n) 
 
The primary key pk needs to be in clear-text, since it is 
used to retrieve the decrypting keys from the central 
Synchronizer. We dropped this idea because it requires 
changing the I/O code for each possible database type and an 
attacker may obtain some information such as table, primary 
key and number of rows. 
Our current solution is to encrypt the whole row by AES 
symmetric algorithm. The encryption overhead is lower than 
the previous solution and all information is hidden to curious 
eyes. To relate the encrypted row (stored locally) to the 
decrypting key (stored in the remote Synchronizer), we use a 
new key (id_pending_row). The encrypted row is prefixed 
by a clear-text header containing the id_pending_row 
delimited by “$” and “@”. The encrypted value is then 
stored in a hexadecimal representation, so a generic row is of 
the form: 
 
$27@5DAAAED5DA06A8014BFF305A93C957D 
 
a) Load time 
At load time, the .script file will contain clear-text and 
encrypted rows, e.g.: 
 
INSERT INTO students(id,name) VALUES(12,'Alice'); 
INSERT INTO students(id,name) VALUES(31,'Bob'); 
$27@5F3C25EE5738DAAAED5DA06A80F305A93C95A 
$45@5DA67ADA06AAED580FA914BF3C953057D387F 
INSERT INTO students(id,name) VALUES(23,'Carol'); 
 
The class whose task is reading the file and loading the 
appropriate data in memory is ScriptReaderText. 
 
Figure 17.  UML of ScriptReaderText class  
 
The readLoggedStatement method parses each line of 
text in the .log or .script files and forwards the result to the 
processStatement method, which loads data into memory. 
We changed the readLoggedStatement method to make a 
preprocessing: if it finds a record header (enclosed between $ 
and @) in the text line, it extracts the 
id_pending_row_received. Using this id, the client requests 
to the central Synchronizer the related decoding key, which it 
uses to decrypt the entire text line and to proceed with 
normal HyperSQL management. If the decoding key is 
unavailable, the text line is temporarily discarded (it is not 
deleted if it was not received for communication problem 
with the Synchronizer).  
b) Save time 
The class ScriptWriterText manages the write operations 
in .log and .script files.  
The affected methods are writeRow and 
writeRowOutToFile.  
The former deals with building the string that will be 
written into the text file (INSERT INTO ....) wich 
corresponds to the in memory data. A Table instance 
contains the information about the table structure (table 
name, field names, types of data, constraints, etc.). The 
values of fields are in an array of Object. The SQL insert is 
written in a text buffer that is stored in the .script file by the 
method writeRowOutToFile. Because each table has an 
id_pending_row_received column, we modified the 
writeRow method to check if the row is owned or shared by 
another user. In the latter case (id_pending_row_received not 
null), the custom writeRowOutToFileCrypto method is used 
instead of the writeRowOutToFile method.  
WriteRowOutToFileCrypto uses the parameter 
id_pending_row_received to query the related symmetric 
encryption key from the Synchronizer, needed to encrypt the 
whole buffer. The result is a hexadecimal sequence, which is 
prefixed by the below header with the 
id_pending_row_received. 
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Figure 18.  UML of ScriptWriterText class 
 
2) Server side 
When a data owner adds or updates a row in the local 
database, it needs to distribute this change to all the related 
users. To do this, we put the cloud a central Synchronizer 
server that acts as a mailbox. 
It uses a simple database with the following tables: 
• Users: containing, among others, the id and public 
key of each user; 
• Pending Rows: it contains the rows that are 
added/modified in the local database of the owner, 
until they are delivered to destination. A unique 
row_id is automatically assigned to each pending 
row. Other information is submission date, sender 
and receiver. The changed row is stored in  
encrypted form in field encrypted_row; 
• Decrypting keys: contains the keys that are used to 
decrypt the pending rows. Other information is: 
sender, receiver, expiry date, id_row. 
At modification time, the owner (client side) has to: 
• Serialize the row; 
• Generate a symmetric key to encrypt it; 
• Encrypt the row; 
• Encrypt the key by the public keys of receivers; 
• Send the encrypted row and the decoding keys to 
receiver. 
Because we store the serialized row, we haven't to worry 
about columns data types. 
The Synchronizer uses RMI to expose its services to 
clients. The services are grouped in three interfaces: 
• KeyInterface with methods related to encryption 
keys: depositKey, deleteDecriptingKey, 
getDecriptingKeyByIdPendingRow, 
getPublicKeyByUser; 
• SynInterface with methods for sharing the rows: 
sendRow, getPendingRowForUser, getAllUsers, 
resendRow; 
• RegistrationInterface to register and manage users: 
registerUser, SelectUserById, 
selectUserByIdAndPassword. 
C. Performances 
1) Read operations 
The system uses decryption only at start time, when 
records are loaded from the disk into the main memory. Each 
row is decrypted none (if it is owned by local node) or just 
once (if it is owned by a remote node), so this is optimal for 
read operations. Each decryption implies an access to the 
remote Synchronizer to download the related decrypting key 
and, eventually, the modified row. 
2) Write operations 
Write operations occur when a record is inserted / 
updated into the db.  There is no overload until the client, 
when online, explicitly synchronizes data with the central 
server. At this moment, for each modified record, the client 
need to: 
• Generate a new (symmetric) key 
• Encrypt the record 
• Dispatch the encrypted data and the decrypting key 
to the remote synchronizer 
3) Benchmark 
We wrote a test application that uses our modified 
HyperSQL driver and interacts with the other clients through 
our Synchronizer. It has these distinct activities: 
• Creation of database and sample tables 
• Population of tables with sample values 
• Sharing of a portion of data with another user 
• Receipt of shared dossiers from other users 
• Opening of the newly created (and populated) 
database  
The application receives three parameters: 
• Number of dossiers 
• Number of clients  involved in sharing 
• Percentage of shared dossiers 
To minimize communication delay, the central 
Synchronizer and the clients ran on the same computer. For 
testing purpose, it was sufficient to use only two clients (to 
enable data sharing). The tests used a number of dossiers 
varying from 1,000 to 500,000. We tested the system with 
20% and 40% of shared dossiers.  
The application was compared with an equivalent one 
with the following differences: 
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• It used the unmodified HyperSQL driver 
• It did not share data with other clients 
• When populating the database, it created the same 
number of dossiers than the previous application; 
but, after benchmarking, it added the number of 
shared dossiers to have the same final number of 
dossiers. 
We benchmarked the system using single-table dossiers 
of about 200 bytes, in two batteries of tests; the first with 
20%, and the second with 40% of shared dossiers, which 
numbered from 1,000 to 500,000. The results are represented 
by the graphs in Figures 19-21. It is worth noting that the 
overhead percentage of the modified solution rapidly 
decreases (with 100,000 dossiers it is around 10%), either in 
the first battery of tests (Figure 19), and either in the second 
(Figure 20). In the tests, the total delay (load + create + 
populate + receive) stay linear in the number of dossiers and 
is limited, even with a huge number of dossiers (Figure 21). 
Local results can be slightly altered by external events not 
preventable (e.g., garbage collector). 
D. Results 
The delay of the system is tightly bound to 
communications effort with the central Synchronizer. 
Computing overhead is limited to just one encryption per 
record at write time and no more than one decryption per 
record at read time. Since I use symmetric encryption, these 
operations are very fast. The benchmark demonstrates that 
the delay is substantially concentrated in database opening, 
while the subsequent use does not involve additional delays, 
compared to the unmodified version. 
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Figure 19.  Overhead when 20% of dossiers are shared 
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Figure 20.  Overhead when 40% of dossiers are shared 
 
 
Figure 21.  Total delay 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
In this paper, we discussed the applicability of 
outsourced DBMS solutions to the cloud and provided the 
outline of a simple yet complete solution for managing 
confidential data in public clouds.   
We are fully aware that a number of problems remain to 
be solved. A major weakness of any data outsourcing 
scheme is the creation of local copies of data after it has been 
decrypted. If a malicious client decrypts data and then it 
stores the resulting plain-text data in a private location, the 
protection is broken, as the client will be available to access 
its local copy after being revoked. In [22], obfuscated web 
presentation logic is introduced to prevent client from 
harvesting data. This technique, however, exposes plaintext 
data to cloud provider.  The plain-text data manager is 
always the weak link in the chain and any solution must 
choose whether to trust the client-side or the server-side. A 
better solution [26] is to watermark the local database to 
provide tamper detection. 
Another issue concerns the degree of trustworthiness of 
the participants. Indeed, untrusted Synchronizer never holds 
plain-text data; therefore it does not introduce an additional 
Trusted Third Party (TTP) with respect to the solutions 
described at the beginning of the paper. However, we need to 
trust the Synchronizer to execute correctly the protocols 
explained in this paper. This is a determining factor that our 
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technique shares with competing solutions and, although an 
interesting topic, it lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
In experiment phase, we introduced a simple solution to 
row-level encryption of databases using IMDBs. It can be 
used in the cloud to manage very granular access rights in a 
highly distributed database. This allows for stronger 
confidence in the privacy of shared sensitive data. 
An interesting field of application is the use in (business) 
cooperative environments, e.g., professional networks. In 
these environments, privacy is a priority, but low computing 
resources don't allow the use of slow and complex 
algorithms. IMDBs and our smart encryption, instead, 
achieve the goal in a more effective way. 
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